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Abstract
We survey the recent European UMTS license auctions and compare
their outcomes with the predictions of a simple model that emphasizes future
market structure as a main determinant of valuations for licenses. Since the
main goal of most spectrum allocation procedures is economic e¢ciency, and
since consumers (who are a¤ected by the ensuing market structure) do not
participate at the auction stage, good designs must alleviate the asymmetry
among incumbents and potential entrants by actively encouraging entry.
1. Introduction
Europe has taken the global lead in the issuance of third generation (3G) licenses
for mobile telecommunications according to the UMTS/IMT 2000 family of stan-
dards. First generation networks o¤ered simple analogue voice telephony; current
systems (2G according to the GSM standard) added some data services like fax
and e-mail; Besides increased encoding e¢ciency (up to …ve times), 3G networks
should, in theory, be capable of providing transmission rates up to 2 Megabits
per second, and thus the prospect of high-resolution video, multimedia, mobile
o¢ce, virtual banking, and many other on-line services.
The European licensing activity is summarized in Table 1. Several countries
(e.g., Finland, Spain, Norway, Sweden, France) have opted for so called ”beauty
contests” in which licenses are allocated on the basis of a bureaucratic procedure
where several criteria (such as technical expertise, …nancial viability, network
coverage, etc...) are evaluated. These processes are not transparent, are prone
to intense lobying and political intervention, and it is di¢cult to assess whether
they ful…ll some pre-speci…ed goals.
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Other countries ( e.g., UK, Holland, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, Austria)
decided to allocate licenses via an auction procedure1. After observing the auc-
tion revenue obtained in places like the UK and Germany, even countries that
previously opted for beauty contests changed the rules of the game. For example,
Spain considers selling an additional license through auction (the o¢cial licensing
procedure has been completed long ago), and France raised the licensing fee to
a staggering Euro 5 Bn per license. But, contrary, to most accounts in the me-
dia, revenue maximization is not, and should not, be the main goal of spectrum
auctions.
1.1. The Main Goal: Economic E¢ciency
Besides merely allocating spectrum, beauty contests or auctions actively shape
future market structure in the telecommunications industry. The main goal of
most such allocation procedures is economic e¢ciency, which, correctly inter-
preted, means the maximization of the (possibly weighted) sum of consumer and
producer surplus. This maximization exercise must necessarily consider several
alternative market scenarios. In particular, it is important to realize that future
…rm pro…ts and consumer rent will be determined by the number of licensed …rms.
A secondary goal (invariably less advertised in o¢cial documents, but playing an
increased role in practice) is raising revenue for the government2.
A serious hurdle on the way to economic e¢ciency3 is due to the obvious fact
that consumers do not directly participate at the spectrum auctions or beauty
contests. Moreover, an ex-ante measurement of expected consumers’ surplus in
various market constellations is very di¢cult. Therefore, consumer surplus does
not naturally play a role, unless special provisions are made in a careful design.
How should these provisions look like? Since standard oligopoly models predict
that in reasonable ranges both consumers’ surplus and overall e¢ciency increase
with increased competition among …rms, the creation of su¢cient market compe-
tition becomes a proxy goal that can be successfully implemented by license and
capacity allocation schemes. This means that market entry should be actively en-
couraged as long as it is economically viable. It is obvious that this encouragement
must come at the licensing stage since afterward entry is practically impossible
(due to spectrum scarcity, network e¤ects, regulatory constraints, etc...).
1Practically all auctions are preceded by a stage where potential bidders have to qualify in
light of technical, …nancial and other criteria.
2The popular media tends to focus on revenue. Moreover, it seems that the UK auction has
opened the appetite of several European governments.
3Another, more technical di¢culty is presented by the fact that, in complex situations …tting
well some spectrum auction environments, multi-unit e¢cient allocation procedures simply do
not exist and second-best mechanisms are not yet known (see Jehiel and Moldovanu, 1998).
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1.2. Incumbents and Entrants
Potential new entrants (i.e., …rms that do not already operate a GSM network in
the respective country) face two major di¢culties: 1) The …xed cost of setting up
the infrastructure required for 3G services is very large4. In contrast, some of the
2G incumbents’ …xed costs are already sunk, since they can use signi…cant parts of
their already existing facilities5 (e.g., base station sites). 2) A common prediction
is that per-…rm industry pro…t in oligopoly decreases in the number of active
…rms6. Hence, besides expected pro…ts from o¤ering 3G services, incumbents are
also driven by entry pre-emption motives7 (e.g., the need to avoid further losses
relative to the status quo) which translate into increased willingness to pay for
licenses and capacity. Moreover, the advent of 3G networks with more active
…rms will cannibalize also some of the incumbents’ pro…ts in the 2G area since
future 3G operators are usually allowed to o¤er also 2G services based on the
GSM standard.
For any bidder at a license auction, the ”pure” economic value of a license
with a …xed capacity is given by the value of expected pro…ts from operating the
license. This value increases if the license is endowed with more capacity, and
decreases if more …rms are licensed.
An entrant’s valuation for a license with a …xed capacity is obtained by sub-
tracting from the expected pro…t (which depends on the expected number of
licensed …rms) the …xed cost required to build a network.
Besides the need to subtract lower infrastructure costs, an incumbent’s val-
uation for a license with a …xed capacity is obtained by adding to the expected
pro…t (which depends on the expected number of licensed …rms) the pro…t that
will be lost relative to status quo if that incumbent does not get a 3G license.
Tables 2 and 3 illustrate how a major investment bank estimated license values as
a function of the various possible market constellations. While the numbers may
or may not be correct, it is obvious that market structure considerations and the
incumbent/entrant asymmetry played a major role in that bank’s estimates.
Assuming that …rms are otherwise comparable (in terms of costs, know-how,
managerial skill, …nancial strength, etc...), we obtain that, in any feasible market
constellation, incumbents place higher values on licenses than entrants do. Hence,
incumbents are willing to bid higher than entrants, and we should expect that all
4The estimates are of the order of several billions of Euros for large countries. UMTS operates
at higher frequencies, which means that more cells and basis stations are needed than in GSM
networks.
5Some incumbents also enjoy large customer bases ans strong brand names.
6For the e¤ects of such a speci…cation in license auctions with symmetric …rms, see Kamien
(1992), Katz and Shapiro (1986), Kamien and Tauman (1986), Rodriguez (1998). Jehiel and
Moldovanu (1996a) allow for asymmetry among …rms and explicitly consider incumbents and
entrants.
7These and similar e¤ects are well documented and understood, in particular in the area of
innovation - see for example Gilbert and Newberry (1982), Krishna (1993, 1999). In the context
of spectrum license auctions, see also Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000).
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GSM incumbents get licenses if at least one new entrant is licensed.
A consequence of the above conditions is that the playing …eld among incum-
bents and potential new entrants is far from being level, even if the …rms are
otherwise (e.g., technically, managerially, …nancially) alike. Entering the market
by directly overbidding GSM incumbents seems quite di¢cult unless new en-
trants are much more e¢cient and therefore expect higher pro…ts, or incumbents
have tighter budget constraints, etc...If potential new entrants perceive this dis-
advantage8, they will either not bother to bid at all, or they will try to form
consortia with incumbents. Both types of behavior will have an adverse e¤ect on
competitiveness and revenue.
It is of course conceivable that special circumstances lead to an entrant having
a higher value than an incumbent. For example, a particular country license may
be the ”last piece in the puzzle” for a global …rm which consequently may be
willing to pay more than a small incumbent with only local interests. But such
features are hard to predict a-priori, and are subject to constant change since …rms
form and break alliances, change business plans, etc... In our view considerations
based on such transitory features should not play a major role in auction design.
The main question remains how to use the auction design in order to alleviate
the incumbent-entrant asymmetry and to encourage entry.
1.3. Entry Considerations in Practice
1.3.1. The Number of Licenses
The most important variable for controlling entry (and, in our view, one of the
most important ingredient for auction design) is the number of licenses. The
number of new 3G licenses was a hotly debated issue during the UK auction
design stage. In order to achieve economic e¢ciency the eventual UK design
actively tried to level the playing …eld among incumbents (there are 4 GSM
incumbents) and new entrants. Its main feature was reserving the largest license
for a new entrant. On that license only entrants were allowed to bid.
Note than an initial plan called for an ascending auction of 4 licenses9, com-
plemented by a sealed-bid stage to be conducted when only 5 bidders remained
active . One of the purposes of the sealed-bid stage was to allow an entrant to
overbid an incumbent (which could not react anymore) in the uncertain one-shot
sealed-bid procedure (see Klemperer, 2000). After many subsequent deliberations
about the ”right” number of licenses, the designers …xed it to be 5, one more than
the number of incumbents10.
8Klemperer (2000) points out that small perceived advantages (”toeholds”) can be trans-
formed in large advantages during the auction due to cautious behavior in order to avoid the
”winner’s curse”.
9We have vigorously argued against this proposal, for reasons completely analogous to those
that guided us in our critique of the German design.
10 In this transition, the …nal sealed-bid stage has been abandoned as well.
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In contrast to the UK, the Dutch regulatory agency did not recognize that a
directed intervention in order to help new entrants is necessary. It organized an
auction for 5 licenses, where 5 was also the number of GSM incumbents11.
The German regulatory agency also did not recognize that a directed interven-
tion in order to help new entrants is necessary12 or fair towards established …rms.
The German design13 is quite ‡exible, and it allows both for an endogenous num-
ber of licenses and for endogenous capacity endowments (see description below).
2 new …rms (one more than in the UK) can enter the market, but, by acquiring
more than the minimal capacity needed in order to be licensed, the incumbents
can completely preempt entry14. An earlier design which called for 5 licenses
has been abandoned in favor of the present one, because the ‡exible design was
thought to o¤er ”a fair, undiscriminating, and e¢cient market solution to the
problem of …nding the optimal number of licenses”. Moreover, general principles
of competition policy ”require to allow the highest possible number of …rms to
enter the market”.
Related to the number of licenses, the Italian design had a rather naive fea-
ture: It stipulated that, after the bidders qualify for the auction, the number of
licenses can be reduced to ensure that there are more licenses than bidders. Not
surprisingly, the number of bidders that were actually willing to bid was equal to
the a-priori maximal number of licenses plus one so that no reduction occured.
But one …rm very quickly dropped out of the auction (see below for a description
of the outcome). That kind of naivete was surpassed by a twist used in a Turkish
sequential design where the reserve price for a second license was set to be equal
to the selling price of the …rst license15. Consequently, the winner of the …rst
license did very high, presumably more than expected duopoly pro…ts. Since no
second …rm could have bid so high for the second license, that license was not
sold, leaving the …rst winner with a monopoly !
Considerations about entry are not con…ned to the realm of auction design.
Spectrum allocations by other means must also give an adequate answer to the
above problems. Indeed, it is interesting to note that most of the countries which
11Of course, the Netherlands is a relatively small country, and it may be argued that 5 …rms
are su¢cient. But then it is not clear to us why an auction was considered appropriate.
12REG-TP has o¤ered extensive explanations (more than 100 pages) for the chosen licens-
ing procedure. Conceptual errors are common. For example, in the o¢cial German document
explaining the auction design (AK: BK-1b-98/005-2, page 17) we are told that a simultaneous
ascending auction complemented by various activity rules is used in order to reduce the ”win-
ner’s curse” (note that this phenomenon can occur only if the bidders’ valuations have some
”common value” components). In the same paragraph, we are also told that in the present
auction it is enough for bidders to bid up to their valuations, and that they need not spend
resources to get informed about competitors (note that this strategy is optimal in some auctions
without common value components, with unit demand, and without allocative externalities; it
is completely meaningless here...).
13That design has been also used in Austria. See below.
14We harshly criticised this feature in a previous working paper called ”A Critique of the
Planned Rules for the German UMTS/IMT- 2000 License Auction”.
15For this and other stories, see Binmore (2000).
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opted for beauty contests adhered to a simple formula that made entry inevitable:
Number of 3G Licenses = Number of GSM Incumbents + 1
1.3.2. Facilitating entry by reducing infrastructure costs
There are several other feature, not directly pertaining to the auction rules, that
may in‡uence the probability of successful entry through auctions. The adoption
of all or some of the following rules has the e¤ect of decreasing the infrastructure
costs (including …nancing costs), with a stronger relative e¤ect on entrants. They
can play an important role in leveling the …eld between entrants and incumbents.
Italy, for example, wisely adopted all three measures described below.
1. Mandatory roaming. This stipulation requires GSM incumbents to grant
an entrant access (for an appropriate fee) to their networks while the en-
trant builds its own infrastructure. This means that a new entrant can
immediately start to o¤er 2G services and generate a positive cash ‡ow for
the several years it takes to build a new network. The UK design origi-
nally included this feature, but it was overturned following a suit brought
by an incumbent (DT’s subsidiary OneToOne). A ”voluntary” agreement
between the government and two other incumbents will now guarantee free
roaming. In Germany the incumbents complained that a free roaming stip-
ulation infringes on their existing rights, as de…ned by the terms of their
GSM licenses, and the idea was abandoned. The regulatory agency argued
that roaming agreements can and will be achieved by bilateral bargaining
2. License fee payment by installments. Another way to ease the …nancial
constraints is to parse the license fee over several years. While this rule
bene…ts all …rms, it is particularly important for new entrants whose cash
‡ow is going to be negative in the …rst years, due to the large infrastructure
investment. UK adopted such a plan, but the required interest rate was so
high that …rms chose not to use this opportunity. In contrast, Germany
required full payment just 10 days after the auction. As it became clear
that the fees are going to be enormous, adverse reactions on the share prices
and bond ratings were triggered. These reactions were partly responsible
for the timing of the auction’s end (see details below). At the moment, at
least one new entrant is said to be in serious …nancial di¢culties and its
shae price has plummeted.
3. Mandatory site sharing. This stipulation requires GSM incumbents to grant
access to their antennae and relay installations, so that several …rms can
use the same facility. Note that 3G networks will require a denser cell
structure than existing 2G networks. Moreover, it is increasingly di¢cult
to obtain authorization for new sites, due to planning and environmental
restrictions. Dealing with this issue is thought to constitute a sizable share
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of the infrastructure costs. Hence, mandatory site sharing can considerably
reduce these costs. Not surprisingly, incumbents have argued that, due to
technical constraints, site sharing is not feasible on a large scale.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe the
main rules of several European license auctions. In Section 3 we sketch a simple
auction model. We di¤erentiate among several cases, depending on whether the
number of licenses was …xed or endogenous. In Section 4 we compare the model’s
equilibria with the observed auction outcomes. In Section 5 we discuss several
issues connected to the possibility of collusion. Concluding comments are gath-
ered in Section 6. Section 8 displays various tables that summarize the empirical
evidence.
2. The Main Rules of Several European Auctions
2.1. The UK Auction
The chosen design revolves around a simultaneous multiple-round ascending auc-
tion, augmented by various activity rules that control the speed of the auction
and limit to some extent gaming behavior. After each round all bids were revealed
to the bidders. The simultaneous approach and the concept of activity rules have
been introduced and widely employed by the US Federal Communication Com-
mission16. In our view, the most important decision concerned the number of
auctioned licenses, which was …nally …xed to be 5, one more than the number of
GSM incumbents. Moreover, only new entrants were allowed to bid on license A,
which was also endowed with the highest capacity, 2£15 MHz (paired spectrum)
+ 1 £ 5 MHz (unpaired spectrum). Bidding on licenses B,C,D and E was open
to all quali…ed bidders. License B was endowed with 2£ 15 MHz , while licenses
C, D, E were endowed with 2£ 10+1£ 5 MHz each. Hence, both the number of
licenses and their capacity endowments were …xed in advance by the regulator.
2.2. The Dutch Auction
There were 5 licenses and 5 GSM incumbents. Licenses A and B had a capacity
of 2 £ 15 MHz, licenses C,D,E had a capacity of 2 £ 10 MHz. The auction was
simultaneous and ascending and in each round a bidder could bid on at most one
license. Bidders were required to bid at each round in order to remain in the
auction . An exception was the possibility of using a ”pass” card in the …rst 30
rounds of the auction. A minimum increment of 10% of the current price was
used throughout the auction. The information revealed at each stage consisted of:
number of bids on each license, number of highest bids, highest current bidders
and their bids. Finally, there was a reserve price of about Euro 50 million for
16See for example McMillan (1994), McA¤e and McMillan (1996) and Milgrom (1997)
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each license, but this price could be reduced after a stage in which no bids were
made on that license.
2.3. The German and Austrian Auctions
The rather complex design involved two consecutive auctions. The …rst auction
allocates licenses17 together with so called ”duplex” or ”paired” spectrum fre-
quencies . The second auction allocates paired spectrum that has not been sold
at the …rst auction, together with additional ”unpaired” spectrum. Both auctions
are of the ”simultaneous multiple-round ascending” type.
The License Auction Bidders do not directly submit bids for licenses. In-
stead, the auctioned objects are 12 blocks18 of paired spectrum. Each block
consists of 2£ 5 Mhz.
The crucial design ingredient is as follows: A bidder obtains a license only if
he acquires at least two blocks, but a bidder is allowed to acquire (at most) three
blocks. As a consequence, both the number of licensed …rms and the capacity
endowments are endogenous. The number of licensed …rms can, in principle, vary
between 0 and 6. Note that if all blocks are sold there will be no less than 4
licenses (which equals the number of GSM incumbents in both Germany and
Austria)
Each block has a reserve price of DM 100 Million in Germany and Euro 50
Million in Austria. The design was complemented by various activity rules19.
Most importantly, at each round a bidder must bid on at least two blocks (al-
though the blocks were abstract and identical, bids carried name tags). Bidding
on only two blocks at round t precludes bidding on three blocks at all rounds
t0 > t:
A block may fail to be sold either because there were no bids for that block
above the reserve price, or because the bidder who submitted the highest bid on
that particular block ultimately fails to acquire two blocks (and hence fails to be
licensed), in which case he is not required to make a payment20.
The Auction for Additional Capacity The purpose of the second auction is
to allocate additional capacity among the bidders that were licensed at the …rst
auction. This means that only those bidders that previously acquired at least
two paired blocks of 2£ 5 MHz are allowed to participate.
17Licenses are awarded for a period of 20 years, and no resales are allowed.
18Blocks are ”abstract”, i.e., the exact location of each block in the spectrum will be deter-
mined ex-post, to ensure that a bidder gets adjacent blocks.
19For example, in each round of the German auction, bids can be increased only by a pre-
announced minimum increment which is a multiple of DM 100.000.
20Since bidders are, at each round, required to seriously bid on at least two blocks, it is not
possible to bid high on a unique bid just in order to make others pay more.
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Besides unsold paired blocks from the …rst auction, the second auction will
allocate additional 5 unpaired blocks of 1 £ 5 MHz each21. Bidders can acquire
any number of unpaired blocks, but are not allowed to acquire more than 1 paired
block. Each unpaired block had a reserve price of DM 50 Million in Germany,
and Euro 25 Million in Austria.
2.4. The Italian Auction
There were a maximum of 5 identical licenses22 with a capacity of 2£ 10 + 1£ 5
MHz. An interesting rule stipulated that, in case that there are only 5 or less
bidders at the auction, the number of licenses can be reduced to be one less than
the number of bidders.
In each round a bidder could make one bid. and the …ve highest bids deter-
mined the current allocation (hence bids were not named to indicate a particular
license). Each winner was supposed to pay his own bid (and not, for example,
the highest losing bid). The reserve price was about Euro 2 billion per license.
3. A Simple Model
We use the following simple models in order to make precise several verbal ar-
guments made in the Introduction. Moreover, we believe that the model helps
to understand the concepts that are necessary for conducting an informed dis-
cussion. Its main feature is the fact that valuations for licenses are endogenous,
and depend on market structure. This aspect seems to be very well understood
by …rms and analysts. For example, a major investment bank23, estimated per
license values of Euro 14.75 Bn, 15.88 Bn and 17.6 Bn for a German symmetric
market with 6, 5, or 4 …rms, respectively. Such a feature (which abstractly trans-
lates in the presence of allocative externalities) has been only recently introduced
in the theoretical auction literature24 (see Jehiel and Moldovanu, 1996a, 1996b,
1998, 2000a, 2000b).
21Only 4 of the unpaired blocks are abstract, while the …fth one is isolated, and may be used
only under additional constraints. Hence, if 5 …rms become licensed at the …rst auction, at least
one of them must get capacity of somewhat reduced quality at the second auction. If the …rst
auction produces 6 licensed bidders, then at least one of them will not be able to acquire any
additional capacity at the second auction.
22Licenses were awarded for a duration of 15 years.
23See ”UMTS. The countdown has begun” by WestLB Panmure, 2000.
24An excellent recent survey of the ”traditional” auction literature - where values are either
exogenous or only subject to informational externalities- is o¤ered by Klemperer (1999).
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3.1. A pre-determined number of licenses (UK , Holland, Italy25)
The bidders at the auction are the n ¸ 2 special …rms called ”incumbents” and
m ¸ 2 …rms called ”entrants”26. A …xed number k ¸ n of new 3G licenses
are auctioned27. We assume that bids can be made in multiples of a minimum
increment denoted by "; and we assume that " is small enough in relation to the
other parameters28.
Bidders are characterized by values attached to feasible auction outcomes.
These endogenous values re‡ect the expected pro…ts in various feasible market
constellations. We assume here for simplicity that all incumbents are symmetric,
and that all potential entrants are symmetric. Moreover, we assume that values
are common knowledge among bidders.
Suppose that s · k entrants acquire a new license. We denote then by ¼(n+s)
¸ 0 the per-…rm expected pro…t in the future mobile telephony market for a bidder
that acquires a 3G license. This pro…t is a decreasing function of the total number
of licensed …rms in the market. We denote by ¡°(n + s) · 0 the expected loss
(relative to the present status-quo) of a GSM incumbent that does not acquire
a 3G license29. The positive function ° is also decreasing in its argument. The
expected pro…t of a potential entrant that does not get licensed is zero.
Finally, we denote by ci and by ce the …xed costs that must be born by an
incumbent and by an entrant, respectively, in order to build a viable 3G network.
These costs are deemed to be signi…cant in relation to the above values, and we
also make the realistic assumption that ce ¡ ci > ".
Hence, if s entrants acquire a license, an incumbent that acquires a 3G license
for a price p gets a payo¤ of ¼(n+ s)¡ p¡ ci: An incumbent who does not get a
3G license has a payo¤ of ¡°(n+ s): An entrant that acquires a 3G license for a
price p has a payo¤ of ¼(n+ s)¡ p¡ ce: An entrant that does not get a license
has a payo¤ of zero.
3.1.1. Analysis
In our present framework, simultaneous ascending auctions have, for each set of
parameters, many equilibria, resulting in di¤erent allocations and payo¤s. More-
over, the equilibrium number of licensed …rms may vary with the parameters.
25As mentioned above, the Italian design had a predetermined number of licenses once it
became clear how many bidders quali…ed for the auction.
26For example, there were 9 entrants bidding in the UK auction.
27 In all planned or completed UMTS auctions the number of licenses was at least as large as
the number of GSM incumbents. For an analysis of the ”war of attrition” phenomenon occuring
when this assumption is not ful…lled, see Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000).
28To be precise, this means that strict inequalities among various valuations and high bids
are not reversed if up to three minimum increments are added or subtracted to one side of the
inequality.
29For example, this includes pro…ts that an incumbent expects to loose in the 2G market
(relative to the status-quo), or losses felt by the management of a potentially shrinking …rm,
etc...
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Besides various technical details associated with the simultaneous ascending auc-
tion (which play no role for our argument30), the multiplicity is also caused by
the fact that valuations are endogenous and depend on expectations about the
…nal number of licensed …rms.
We ”ignore” below the reserve prices, i.e., we assume that the relevant equi-
librium bids are all above the reserve price. Moreover, we consider below only
equilibria where identical objects (licenses or capacity blocks) sell for the same
price (modulo minimum bid increments). In fact, one can construct equilibria
where this assumption is not ful…lled, but this symmetry is a reasonable working
assumption. Moreover, this feature is considered to be a big advantage of the
simultaneous ascending auction.
Proposition 3.1. Consider any equilibrium where at least one entrant acquires
a license (with probability 1). In this equilibrium, each of the incumbents must
acquire a license.
Proof. Consider an equilibrium where s ¸ 1 new entrants are licensed, and
consider a new entrant who payed p ¸ 0 for its license (call this license A). Since
the entrant’s payo¤ must be non-negative, we obtain that ¼(n+ s)¡ p¡ ce ¸ 0;
which is equivalent to p · ¼(n + s) ¡ ce: Assume, by contradiction, that an
incumbent does not get a license. In particular, this means that this incumbent
bids less than p on license A, and that this incumbent has a payo¤ of ¡°(n+ s):
Consider now a deviation where the incumbent bids p + " on the above license.
With such a strategy, his payo¤ becomes ¼(n+ s¡ 1)¡ (p+ ")¡ ci ¸ ¼(n+ s¡
1)¡ (¼(n+ s)¡ ce)¡ "¡ ci > ce ¡ ci ¡ " (because ¼(n+ s¡ 1) > ¼(n+ s)) and
ce¡ ci¡ " > 0 ¸ ¡°(n+ s): Hence, the deviation is pro…table, a contradiction to
the assumption that we considered an equilibrium.
Remark 1. Roughly speaking, the above Proposition shows that incumbents
have higher valuations than new entrants (recall that valuations are endogenous
here). There are three reasons why this is so. First, irrespective of the market
structure con…guration, the …xed cost ci of incumbent is higher than that of
entrants ce. Second, incumbents are ready to pay an extra °(n+ s) as compared
with entrants because of the synergy between 2G and 3G licenses. Third, - since
incumbents are already present in the market - the acquisition of a 3G license by
an incumbent is less damaging to the per-…rm pro…ts than the acquisition by an
entrant. This is re‡ected by the fact that ¼(n+ s¡ 1)¡ ¼(n+ s) > 0.
Remark 2. In view of the remark above, we implicitly use below the only tie-
breaking rule that is consistent with more general formulations (where valuations
are continuously distributed and strictly higher valuations lead to strictly higher
bids): a new entrant cannot win a license if there is an incumbent who bids at
least as high as the entrant on that block.
30For example, we ignore any coordination problems such as ”who bids on what blocks”.
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Proposition 3.2. Assume that the number of new licenses equals the number
of incumbents, i.e., k = n; and that ¼(n + 1) ¡ ce ¸ 0 .The following strategies
de…ne an equilibrium: each entrant bids ¼(n+ 1)¡ ce and each incumbent bids
¼(n + 1) ¡ ce + ": In this equilibrium all incumbents get licensed, there is no
additional entry, and revenue is approximately given by n¼(n+ 1):
Proof. If the above strategies are played, entrants get a payo¤ of zero and
incumbents get a payo¤ of ¼(n)¡¼(n+1)+ ce¡ ci¡ " > 0: The above strategies
form an equilibrium because: 1) Given that all other incumbents bid above ¼(n+
1) ¡ ce , an incumbent i has no incentives to bid below that since this means
leaving a license to an entrant, yielding a payo¤ of ¡°(n+1) · 0 . 2) Given that
an entrant expects that all other licenses go to incumbents, the value of a license
to an entrant is ¼(n+ 1)¡ ce:
Proposition 3.3. Assume that the number of new licenses is higher than the
number of incumbents, i.e., k > n; and that ¼(k) ¡ ce ¸ 0 . The following
strategies de…ne an equilibrium: each entrant bids ¼(k)¡ ce and each incumbent
bids ¼(k)¡ ce+ ": In this equilibrium all incumbents get licensed, k¡n entrants
also get licensed and revenue is approximately given by k¼(k):
Proof. If the above strategies are played, entrants (whether licensed or not !)
get a payo¤ of zero and incumbents get a payo¤ of ce ¡ ci ¡ " > 0: The above
strategies form an equilibrium because: 1) Given that all other bidders bid at
least ¼(k) ¡ ce , an incumbent i has no incentives to bid below that since this
means leaving a license to an entrant, yielding a payo¤ of ¡°(k + 1) · 0 . 2)
Given that an entrant expects that n out of k licenses go to incumbents, the value
of a license to an entrant is ¼(k)¡ ce:
3.2. An endogenous number of licenses (Germany, Austria)
The bidders at the auction are the n = 4 special …rms called ”incumbents” and
m ¸ 2 …rms called ”entrants”. 12 identical blocks are auctioned according to the
rules detailed in Section 2.331..
If s new entrants acquire 3G licenses, we denote by ¼q(n+ s) ¸ 0 a bidder’s
value for q blocks, q = 2; 3, as a function of the number of licensed …rms in the
market. We assume that ¼q is decreasing in n and increasing in k: The rest of
the de…nitions, notation and assumptions is as above.
3.2.1. Analysis
We …rst prove a Proposition that identi…es the advantage enjoyed by incumbents.
31We focus here on the main …rst stage and ignore the additional strategic complexity induced
by the presence of the second stage.
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Proposition 3.4. Consider any equilibrium where at least one new entrant ac-
quires q ¸ 2 blocks (and thus it is licensed). In this equilibrium, each of the 4
incumbents acquires at least q blocks (and thus all 4 incumbents must also be
licensed).
Proof. Consider an equilibrium where n+ s …rms are licensed, including a new
entrant who obtains q blocks, q ¸ 2; by paying b per block. Since the entrant’s
payo¤ must be non-negative, we have ¼q(n+ s)¡ qb¡ ce ¸ 0; which is equivalent
to b · ¼q(n+s)¡ceq : Assume, by contradiction, that an incumbent does not get a
license. In particular, this means that the incumbent bids less than b on the above
blocks, and that this incumbent has a payo¤ of ¡°(n+ s) · 0: Consider now a
deviation where the incumbent bids b + " on the above blocks32. With such a
strategy, his payo¤ becomes ¼q(n+ s¡1)¡ q(b+ ")¡ ci ¸ ¼q(n+ s¡1)¡¼q(n+
s) + ce ¡ ci > 0 ¸ ¡°(n+ s): Hence, the deviation is pro…table, a contradiction
to the assumption that we considered an equilibrium.
There are three main outcomes, di¤ering by the number of licensed …rms. The
next three results determine the conditions on the parameters that are necessary
in order to sustain each outcome. The conditions relate the …rms’ valuations in
various market constellations.
Proposition 3.5. Consider the following strategy pro…le: each entrant bids on
three blocks up to be =
¼3(5)¡ce
3 per block; each incumbent bids on three blocks
up to bi = be+" per block. If ¼3(4)¡¼2(4) ¸ ¼3(5)¡ce3 ¸ ¼2(5)¡ce2 then this pro…le
constitutes an equilibrium33. The licensed …rms are the 4 incumbents. The
revenue in this equilibrium, approximately 4(¼3(5) ¡ ce), is the highest possible
among all symmetric equilibria with 4 licensed …rms.
Proof. By the above Proposition, if an entrant gets a license in equilibrium, then
the 4 incumbents must also be licensed. Hence, the highest value34 an entrant can
ever achieve by being licensed is ¼3(5) : According to the above described bidding
strategies, entrants are not licensed, and get a payo¤ of zero. Bidding below be
on one or more blocks cannot improve their payo¤, while bidding b > be on three
blocks yields a payo¤ of ¼3(5)¡3b¡ce < ¼3(5)¡3be¡ce = 0 and bidding b > be on
two blocks yields a payo¤ of ¼2(5)¡2b¡ce · ¼3(5)¡3b¡ ce < ¼3(5)¡3be¡ce =
0: Hence, the entrants’ strategy cannot be improved upon. Consider now an
incumbent. By bidding bi = be + "; he gets three blocks and is licensed. His
payo¤ is given by ¼3(4) ¡ 3bi ¡ ci = ¼3(4) ¡ ¼3(5) + ce ¡ ci ¡ 3" > 0 ¸ ¡°(4):
It is clear that bidding higher on some blocks is not optimal. If the incumbent
32 In an equilibrium where not all blocks sell for the same price, the proof is modi…ed by letting
the incumbent mimic the entrant.
33An equilibrium with the same physical outcome (4 licensed incumbents) but di¤erent pay-
ments exists also if ¼3(4) ¡ ¼2(4) ¸ ¼2(5)¡ce2 ¸ ¼3(5)¡ce3 :In this equilibrium, entrants bid only
on two blocks.
34Recall that ¼3(5) ¸ ¼2(5); and that ¼3(5) ¸ ¼3(6) ¸ ¼2(6)):
13
bids lower on two or more blocks, then he looses the license, yielding a payo¤
of ¡°(4) · 0; hence this cannot be optimal. If the incumbent bids lower on
one block, then his payo¤ is given by ¼2(4) ¡ 2bi ¡ ci · ¼3(4) ¡ 3bi ¡ ci: We
conclude that the described strategy is optimal for the incumbent, and that we
have described an equilibrium
Proposition 3.6. A necessary condition for the existence of an equilibrium with
6 licensed …rms is given by ¼3(5) · 3¼2(6)¡ce2 .
Proof. By Proposition 3.4, the 6 licensed …rms must include the 4 incumbents.
In an equilibrium with 6 licensed …rms where the block price is b, entrants get
a payo¤ of ¼2(6) ¡ 2b ¡ ce: Since this payo¤ must be non-negative we obtain
b · ¼2(6)¡ce2 : An incumbent’s payo¤ is given by ¼2(6)¡ 2b¡ ci: Assume now that
an incumbent deviates and bids b + " on one block. Then, there will be only
…ve licensed …rms, and this incumbent’s payo¤ is given by ¼3(5) ¡ 3b ¡ " ¡ ci:
For the outcome with 6 licensed …rms to be an equilibrium, it is necessary that
¼3(5) ¡ 3b ¡ " ¡ ci · ¼2(6) ¡ 2b ¡ ci: This is equivalent to ¼3(5) · ¼2(6) + b:
Because b · ¼2(6)¡ce2 ; we obtain the necessary condition ¼3(5) · 3¼2(6)¡ce2 :
Proposition 3.7. A necessary condition for the existence of an equilibrium with
5 licensed …rms is given by ¼3(4) · 3¼2(5)¡ce2 .
Proof. The only possible con…guration with 5 licenses is one where 2 …rms
acquire 3 blocks each, and 3 …rms acquire 2 blocks each. By Proposition 3.4 we
obtain that 2 incumbents acquire 3 blocks each, 2 incumbents acquire 2 blocks
each, and a new entrant acquires two blocks. Hence, there are two incumbents
that can possibly improve their payo¤ by bidding on additional capacity. The
proof follows exactly as in the previous Proposition.
4. Comparison between Auctions’ Outcomes and Models’ Predic-
tions
4.1. UK Outcome
There were 13 participating bidders, and 150 rounds of bidding. The results
are summarized in Tables 4 and 5. 4 licenses were acquired by the 4 GSM
incumbents (with the largest unreserved license going to Vodafone), while the
reserved license A was acquired by an entrant, TIW. Total revenue was £22.5
billion. The identical licenses C, D, and E sold for the same price (slightly more
than £4 billion), while licenses A and B were more expensive (they were endowed
with more capacity). In spite of the high prices, and in spite of ”expressions of
shock” uttered by various …rms, analysts do not believe that …rms have overpaid,
i.e., the discounted value of expected pro…ts minus infrastructure costs is likely
to be higher than the license prices (see table 1 for the estimates of a major
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investment bank). The outcome is the one predicted by Proposition 3.3, where
the number of licenses was higher than the number of incumbents, and where
all incumbents get licensed. In particular, Table 5 displays the …nal bids of all
13 bidders and shows that the average incumbent bid was much higher than the
average entrant bid. Higher valuations for incumbents constituted indeed the
driving force behind our theoretical results.
4.2. Dutch Outcome
There were 6 bidders (5 incumbents, one entrant). The results are summarized
in Table 6. The …ve licenses were acquired by the …ve GSM incumbents (with
the large licenses going to KPN and to Vodafone’s subsidiary, Libertel). Total
revenue was a relatively low 2.7 billion Euro. These features agree well with the
prediction of Proposition 3.2, where the number of licenses equals the number
of incumbents, and where no entrants are licensed. Several interesting things
happened during the auction: In the …rst stages of the auction all bidders used
pass-cards, thus bringing the reserve prices (with the exception of one license) to
zero ! This considerably prolonged the auction. Also, the only participating new
entrant, Versatel, stepped out very early claiming that it was threatened not to
drive prices up by an incumbent (BT’s subsidiary, Telfort). This disappointing,
but predictable, outcome is now the subject of a parliamentary inquiry.
4.3. German Outcome
The outcome is summarized in Tables 7 and 8. The German auction was probably
the most dramatic one since the government risked a highly concentrated market
by explicitly exploiting preemptive motives (probably for the sake of increased
revenue). Luckily for the government, the outcome produced both high revenue
and two new entries35.
There were only 7 bidders (including 4 GSM incumbents), after 6 other quali-
…ed bidders ultimately withdrew from the auction. The auction’s …rst stage lasted
for 3 weeks and 173 rounds of bidding, and resulted in 6 licenses being awarded.
The licensed …rms were the 4 incumbents and two new entrants (one of them
already operating as service provider). Each licensed …rm acquired 2 blocks of
paired spectrum at the main license auction (recall the complex design described
above), and each license cost approximately Euro 8.4 Bn (or Euro 4.2 Bn per
block). The most interesting thing occurred after one of the potential entrants,
Debitel, left the auction after 125 rounds and after the price level reached Euro
2.5 Bn per block. Since 6 …rms were left bidding for a maximum of 6 licenses, the
auction could have stopped immediately. Instead, the remaining …rms (and in
particular the two large incumbents) continued bidding in order to acquire more
capacity. But no other …rm was willing to quit, and, after intense pressure from
35Klemperer (2000) joins our opinion that the successful outcome (from the point of view of
the government) was due to luck rather than good design.
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stock markets and bond rating agencies36, bidding for more capacity stopped
in round 173. Compared to round 125, there was no change in the physical
allocation, but …rms where, collectively, Euro 20 Bn poorer!
Can this bizarre outcome be explained ? Note that a design that allows for
a ‡exible number of licenses and a ‡exible capacity endowment for these licenses
completely endogenizes the bidders’ valuations and opens the door to complex
gaming behavior during an ascending auction. The speci…c capacity limitation
rules implied that in any possible auction outcome which includes entry (with 5
or 6 licensed …rms) there is at least one new …rm (this must be an entrant by
the result of Proposition 3.4) that has acquired exactly the minimum mandated
two blocks. If this …rm looses one block, then it looses the entire license. Thus,
besides getting ”pure” economic value by acquiring one block of capacity in excess
of the minimum two blocks, an incumbent gets substantial extra value because it
can deny an entire license to a new entrant, thus avoiding a foreseeable decrease
in expected pro…ts caused by additional entry.
We believe that the main reason why prices were so high37 is due to the will-
ingness of the incumbents (in particular the two large ones) to preempt entry. But
the incumbents’ attempt failed, as there were eventually 6 licensees (see Propo-
sition 3.6 for the conditions that are necessary to sustain such an outcome while
assuming equilibrium behavior; we cannot assess whether the bizarre outcome
was indeed consistent with equilibrium) There are several potential explanations
for this failure. First, as mentioned above there was an intense pressure from
stock markets (and it is not clear that the stock market pressure could have been
easily anticipated). Second, since there were only two …nancially strong incum-
bents, and since prices were already high when Debitel stepped out, at least one
entry looked plausible. As one entry was likely to occur, the value of avoiding a
second entry was somewhat reduced (even though the two big incumbents were
apparently ready to pay a lot to have only …ve licensees). Third, it is plausi-
ble that France Telecom’s insistence to enter the German market was (at least
partly) driven by the wish to revenge the previous ”treason” by its former partner,
Deutsche Telekom.
Another intriguing explanation for the level of prices arises by noting that
DT is still majority owned by the German government. Hence, by driving up
prices, DT clearly served the interest its major shareholder who happened to be
the auctioneer (while the price it paid itself can be partly seen as a transfer from
one government pocket to another)38.
In the second stage 5 …rms (3 incumbents and 2 entrants) each acquired an ad-
ditional block of unpaired spectrum. There was no serious bidding in which …rms
tried to acquire more capacity - note that the preemptive motive was greatly re-
36Most bond ratings for the involved …rms were subsequently downgraded from AA to A.
37Note that prices per head were still lower than in the UK .
38Several winning …rms expressed their anger about that. A lawsuit was brought by one of
the small incumbents, but it was not further pursued.
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duced in that stage since the number of licenses was already determined. It seems
that the enormous price paid at the …rst stage did not allow further ‡exibility
(in particular, the smallest incumbent Viag Interkom was so budget constrained
that it could not a¤ord serious bidding at all).
4.4. Austrian Outcome
In Austria there were exactly 6 bidders (4 of them GSM incumbents) for a max-
imum of 6 licenses. Hence, in principle, the license auction could have ended
immediately, at the reserve price (Euro 50 mil. per license). Nevertheless, a phe-
nomenon similar to the German one occurred. The license auction continued for
another 16 rounds, before stopping with...6 licensed …rms, each paying Euro 120
mil. per license (see Table 9). Hence, about Euro 420 mil. have been again spent
for ”nothing” while …rms tried to buy more capacity and reduce the number of
licenses.
4.5. Italian Outcome
There were 6 bidders, 4 incumbents and 2 new entrants. Hence, according to the
rules, the number of licenses was not reduced and remained …xed at 5, and at
least was one new entry was inevitable. The auction ended after 11 rounds, after
Blu, the smallest and weakest incumbent, dropped out. The remaining 5 …rms
paid about Euro 2.4 billion per license (see Table 10). Apparently, Blu gave up
following serious con‡icts about …nancing between the Italian shareholders and
the main foreign backer, BT. The government was furious about the early end of
the auction, and accused Blu of and other …rms of manipulations39. Threats to
cancel the auction while forfeiting the deposits (which were about as high as the
…nal prices) were aired. Finally, the auction’s outcome has been authorized. It is
possible that, besides Blu’s management and organization problems, the generous
stipulations made for entrants (see Subsection 1.3.2) contributed to the auction’s
outcome.
5. Collusion
All above considerations were based on a behavioral model which assumes that
bidders do not collude. Of course explicit collusion during the auction is forbid-
den by the auction rules in all countries, and usually severe steps are taken to
ensure that bidders cannot directly communicate during the auction. But ”tacit
collusion” remains a major issue. We brie‡y discuss here several issues that also
relate to the incumbent -entant asymmetry. For other themes related to collusion
see also Klemperer (2000)
39The idea was that Blu has been possibly ”asked” to take part in the auction by other …rms,
thus keeping the number of licenses at 5.
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Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) argue that the simultaneous ascending auction
(through its dynamic, iterative structure) is well suited for incumbents who wish
to coordinate in order to prevent entry40 (without the need of external monetary
transfers). Well designed activity rules can partly alleviate this problem, but
cannot completely solve it.
To illustrate how coordination through signaling of intentions (which is legit-
imate given a design that makes it possible) might work, it is instructive to recall
the result of the October 1999 German auction of extra capacity for the GSM-
1800 standard. The auction covered 10 blocks of paired spectrum. Nine blocks
were identical, each consisting of 2 £ 1 MHz, while the tenth block consisted
of 2 £ 1:4 MHz. Reasonably, only the 4 GSM incumbents were allowed to bid.
Besides a clear need for extra capacity in congested areas, it is possible that the
large players (DT’s subsidiary T-Mobil, and Vodafone’s subsidiary Mannesmann)
were driven by a preemptive motive. The auction was conducted in a simulta-
neous ascending format and the rules did not contain any limitation about the
capacity that can be acquired by any one …rm. The auction proceeded as follows:
After the …rst round, the high bidder on all 10 blocks was Mannesmann, which
o¤ered DM 36.360.000 for each of blocks 1-5, DM 40.000.000 for each of the blocks
6-9 (which, recall, are identical to blocks 1-5), and DM 56.000.000 for the larger
block 10. In the second round, T-Mobil bid41 DM 40.010.000 on blocks 1-5, and
the auction closed. Hence, each of the two larger …rms got 5 blocks , at a price
of DM 20.000.000 per MHz. Here is what one of T-Mobil’s managers said: ”No,
there were no agreements with Mannesmann. But Mannesmann’s …rst bid was a
clear o¤er. Given Game Theory, it was expected that they show what they want
most.” (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 29, 1999, p.13).
Jehiel and Moldovanu (2000) also analyze how the possibility of tacit collu-
sion (requiring no explicit agreement) is a¤ected by other features of the auction
format, most importantly the relation between the number of incumbents and
the number of licenses. An insight derived there is that, from the point of view of
incumbents, sustaining the best collusive outcome as a Nash equilibrium in the
auction is more di¢cult (and may fail) if there is no focal, symmetric method
which allows the incumbents to share the preemption cost. In such a case there
might be free-riding among incumbents, since each one of them prefers to let
other incumbents pay a higher share of the cost 42. In the German 3G design
there was an additional, countervailing, e¤ect since buying more capacity (which
could preempt entry) had also a pure economic value. Towards the end of the
auction there was clear signaling activity among the two large incumbents who
try to sort out whether to continue bidding in order to reduce the number of en-
40They also discuss the possibility of explicit collusion which requires external monetary trans-
fers. For this, see also Caillaud and Jehiel (1998).
41Minimum increments had to be 10% of the last high bid.
42For example, in Germany, there was a method permitting a symmetric allocation of blocks
while avoiding entry. But incumbents were not symmetric.
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trants. Mannesmann made several bids where the smallest free digit (i.e., taking
into account the rules that allowed only bids in multiples of DM 100000) was 6,
suggesting that it was …nally ready to accept an outcome with 6 …rms. Initially,
DT responded with bids ending in 5, suggesting that it was willing to bid even
higher in order to reduce the number of licenses to 5. Only after further price
increases and increased nervousness in the stock markets bidding stopped.
6. Concluding Comments
In complex environments it is necessary to base practical auction engineering
on a sound theoretical foundation that combines the insights of Auction Theory
with those of the body of work known by the name ”Industrial Organization”.
Overlooking market structure details can have far-reaching consequences for the
shaping of one of the most important future markets.
Besides allocating spectrum, license auctions shape future market structure in
irreversible ways. A successful design must level the playing …eld among incum-
bents and potential entrants. The asymmetry among incumbents and entrants
is a constant feature of most license auctions, while many other features (such
as particular aggregation interests or particular alliances across countries ) are of
a more transitory nature. Designs that encourage entry will result in increased
e¢ciency, but they will also generate more revenue since more bidders will be
attracted by the auction if they perceive real chances of winning.
Finally, given the increased global nature of the telecommunication industry,
it may be worthwhile thinking about the advantages and disadvantages of some
kind of ”European super-auction” that allows the aggregation of continent (or
EU) wide licenses besides the national ones. Even if spectrum allocations remain
national a¤airs for the foreseeable future, some harmonization measures may be
required. At the moment, many …rms have complained that beauty contests al-
ways favor national incumbents, while those incumbents (which often got licenses
almost for free in their own coutry) can freely compete with deep pockets in other
countries’auctions.
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8. Tables
Country Population Spectrum Mechanism Licenses New Entrants
(millions) (MHz) (likely)
Austria 7.9 145 auction* 4-6 2
Belgium 10.1 140 auction 4 1
Denmark 5.2 155 beauty contest ? 0-2
Finland 5.3 140 beauty contest* 4 1
France 58.4 140 hybrid 4 1
Germany 82.0 145 auction* 6 2
Greece 10.5 140 ? 3-4 0-1
Ireland 3.6 155 hybrid 4-6 1-3
Italy 57.4 125 auction* 5 2
Netherlands 15.3 145 auction* 5 0
Norway 4.4 140 beauty contest* 4 1
Portugal 9.9 140 beauty contest 4 1
Spain 39.2 140 beauty contest* 4 1
Sweden 8.8 140 beauty contest* 4 1
Switzerland 7.0 ? auction 4 ?
UK 58.7 140 auction* 5 1
Table 1: European 3G license allocation
(* denotes a completed procedure)
Market Structure Firm Type Valuation43
(£ Bn.)
5 …rms, 1 new entrant large incumbent with 3G license 32.1
5 …rms, 1 new entrant small incumbent with 3G license 22.2
6 …rms, 2 new entrants large incumbent without 3G license 12.5
6 …rms, 2 new entrants small incumbent without 3G license 8.1
5 …rms, 1 new entrant new entrant with 3G license 6.4
Table 2: UK valuations
Market Structure Firm Type Valuation44
(Eu Bn.)
4 …rms, 0 new entrants large incumbent with 3G license 88.4
5 …rms, 1 new entrant large incumbent with 3G license 78.3
6 …rms, 2 new entrants large incumbent with 3G license 47.8
5 …rms, 1 new entrant large incumbent without 3G license 36.3
5 …rms, 1 new entrant new entrant with 3G license 14.5
Table 3: German valuations
UK Bandwidth Holder Bid Bid Price/MHz Price/Pop
Licence MHz (£ Bn.) (Eu Bn.) (Eu Mil.) (Eu)
A 2 £ 15 + 1£5 TIW 4.38 7.23 206 126
B 2 £ 15 Vodafone* 5.96 9.84 328 172
C 2 £ 10 + 1 £ 5 BT* 4.03 6.65 266 116
D 2 £ 10 + 1 £ 5 One2One* 4.00 6.60 264 115
E 2 £ 10 + 1 £ 5 Orange* 4.10 6.76 274 118
Total 140 22.47 37.08
Average 28 4.49 7.41 264 129.4
Table 4: Outcome, UK Auction
(* indicates GSM incumbents)
UK Bidders Backers Last Bid Last Bid
(£ Bn.) (Eu Bn.)
Vodafone * Vodafone 5.96 9.84
BT3G * BT 4.03 6.65
One2One * DT 4.00 6.60
Orange * Orange 4.10 6.76
Average Incumbent 4.52 7.46
TIW * TIW 4.38 7.23
NTL NTL, FT 3.97 6.55
SpectrumCo Sonera 2.10 3.47
Epsilon Tele.com Nomura 2.07 3.42
3GUK Eircom 2.00 3.30
Crescent Wireless Global Crossing 1.82 3.00
Global Wireless One.Tel 2.18 3.60
Telefonica UK Telefonica 3.67 6.05
WorldCom Wireless MCI Worldcom 3.17 5.24
Average Entrant 2.82 4.65
Average 3.34 5.51
Table 5: Final Bids, UK Auction
(* indicates a winning bidder)
Dutch Bandwidth Holder Bid Price/MHz Price/Pop
Licence MHz (Eu Bn.) (Eu Mil.) (Eu)
A 2 £ 15 Libertel (Vodafone)* 0.713 23.76 44.84
B 2 £ 15 KPN* 0.711 23.7 44.71
C 2 £ 10 Dutchtone (FT)* 0.435 21.75 27.35
D 2 £ 10 Telfort (BT)* 0.430 21.5 27.04
E 2 £ 10 3G Blue (DT, etc...)* 0.394 19.7 24.77
Total 120 2.683
Average 24 0.536 22.35 33.74
Table 6: Outcome, Dutch Auction
(* indicates GSM incumbents)
German Bidders Backers
T- Mobil* Deutsche Telekom
Mannesmann* Vodafone
E-Plus* KPN, Hutchison
VIAG Interkom* VIAG, BT
Mobilcom Multimedia Mobilcom, France Telecom
Group 3G Telefonica, Sonera
Debitel Swisscom
Table 7: Bidders in the German Auction
(* indicates GSM incumbents;)
Germany Bandwith Holder Bid I. Stage Bid II. Stage Price/Mhz Price/Pop
Licence MHz (Eu Bn.) (Eu Bn.) (Eu Mil.) (Eu)
1 2 £ 10 + 1 £ 5 Mannesmann* 8.42 0.061 339 103
2 2 £ 10+ 1 £ 5 T-Mobil* 8.47 0.062 341 104
3 2 £ 10 + 1 £ 5# E-Plus* 8.39 0.037 337 103
4 2 £ 10 Viag Interkom* 8.44 422 103
5 2 £ 10 + 1 £ 5 Mobilcom 8.36 0.061 336 102
6 2 £ 10 + 1 £ 5 Group 3G 8.40 0.062 338 103
Total 145 50.51 0.286
Average 20 8.42 0.057 352 103
Table 8: Outcome, German Auction
(Debitel left the …rst stage with a last bid of Euro 5 billion)
(* indicates GSM incumbents)
(# indicates unpaired block of lesser quality)
Austria Bandwith Holder Bid I. Stage Bid II. Stage Price/Mhz Price/Pop
Licence MHz (Eu Mil.) (Eu. Mil) (Eu Mil.) (Eu)
1 2 £ 10 3G Mobile 117 5.85 14.8
2 2 £ 10 Connect*(Orange, etc...) 120 6 15.18
3 2 £ 10 + 1 £ 5 Hutchison 3G 114 25 5.56 17.59
4 2 £ 10 + 2 £ 5 max.mobil*(DT) 119 51 5.66 21.51
5 2 £ 10 Mannesmann 3G# 113 5.65 20
6 2 £ 10 + 2 £ 5 Mobilkom* (TI) 121 51 5.73 21.77
Total 145 704 127
Average 24.16 117.3 21.16 5.74 18.47
Table 9: Outcome, Austrian Auction
(* indicates GSM incumbents)
(# Mannesmann was a already a service provider, but without own
network)
Italy Bandwith Holder Bid Price/Mhz Price/Pop
Licence MHz (Eu Bn.) (Eu Mil.) (Eu)
A 2 £ 10 + 1 £ 5 Omnitel*(Vodafone) 2.448 97.92 42.64
B 2 £ 10 + 1 £ 5 Tim*(TI) 2.417 96.68 42.10
C 2 £ 10 + 1 £ 5 Wind*(FT) 2.428 97.12 42.29
D 2 £ 10 + 1 £ 5 Andala 2.428 97.12 42.29
E 2 £ 10 + 1 £ 5 Ipse 2.443 97.72 42.56
Total 125 12.164
Average 25 2.432 97.31 42.37
Table 10: Outcome, Italian Auction
(* indicates GSM incumbents)
(Blu* left the auction with a last bid of Euro 2.319 Bn.)
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